TIME: Almanac 1993/TIME Almanac 1993.iso/time/011689/01168900.050

Text File | 1992-09-23 | 13.2 KB | 261 lines

                                                                                NATION, Page 18

Chemical Reaction


As the U.S. presses Libya over a nerve-gas plant, a shootout
erupts. Did Gaddafi sacrifice two planes so Washington would
take the heat?


    The unlikely combination of Ronald Reagan and Muammar
Gaddafi resembles nitroglycerin: it can produce an explosion at
the slightest jolt. Last week, for the fourth time since 1981,
just such a blowup took place in the Mediterranean skies off
Tobruk, where a shootout that could have been taken right from
the movie Top Gun ended in the downing of two Libyan jets by
American pilots.

    This time, however, there was a major difference. While the
first three incidents occurred when Washington decided to swat
the desert dictator, the latest confrontation was wholly
unexpected. When the Libyan MiGs were destroyed after they
persistently pursued two Navy F-14 fighters protecting the
carrier U.S.S. John F. Kennedy, the U.S. found itself on the
defensive not only militarily but also in its international
relations.

    The eruption came as the Reagan Administration was applying
calculated pressure on Gaddafi, and on U.S. allies, to prevent
the production in Libya of poisonous gases that could be used in
chemical warfare. The U.S. insists that a huge chemical plant at
Rabta, 50 miles southwest of Tripoli and ringed with
antiaircraft batteries, is primarily intended to produce
mustard gas and chemical nerve agents. In a pre-Christmas TV
interview, Reagan refused to rule out the possibility of a
military strike against the plant. On background, Pentagon
experts even suggested that Tomahawk cruise missiles, which can
be launched by surface ships or submarines from as far as 800
miles away, might be used to level the suspect facility.

    The clash that followed -- perhaps intended by Gaddafi --
threw the focus back on Washington's seeming eagerness to swing a
big stick at easy targets. Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard
Shevardnadze noted that the dogfight had "poisoned the
atmosphere" as 142 nations opened a five-day conference in
Paris over the weekend on ways to stop the increasing spread of
chemical weapons. "Gaddafi must be pleased over the incident,"
said an Italian official last week. "It gives him a chance to
play the victim."

    It did little good for a presidential spokesman to protest
that "we didn't try to pick a fight" or for senior U.S.
officials to minimize the possibility that the U.S. would take
out the weapons plant by force. Arab states lined up in the
United Nations to denounce America's "brutal aggression." In
the harshest language the Soviet Union has used toward the U.S.
in two years, the Kremlin labeled the American action "state
terrorism."

    In Western Europe jittery American allies wondered whether
Reagan was once again indulging himself by kicking his favorite
terrorist -- and what the cost would be. Military bases went on
alert in Italy, where Lampedusa Island was the target of an
amateurish Libyan missile attack after the U.S. bombing of
Tripoli in 1986. Britain supported the U.S. assertion that
Rabta is intended for weapons production, but the Thatcher
government urged Washington not to attack it. The French, who
are host to the chemical-weapons conference at UNESCO
headquarters, were irritated. The sharpest criticism came from
the leftist Paris daily Liberation: "Gaddafi has lost two
planes, but Reagan hasn't necessarily won out. These two were
made to detest each other . . . One can understand that their
farewells would be agonizing."

    In its defense, the Pentagon released a dramatic videotape
and voice recording of the aerial encounter taken from one of
the F-14 Tomcats. The seven-minute audiotape chronicles the
five evasive turns made by the Navy flyers in an effort to shake
the MiG-23 "Floggers" that headed at them some 70 miles off the
Libyan coast, well into international waters.

    Moreover, the State Department disclosed that it has been
quietly exchanging messages with Gaddafi for several weeks and
that it sent the Libyan government a detailed explanation of
last week's shooting incident. Still, Libya's U.N. Deputy
Ambassador, Ali Sunni Muntasser, charged that the Navy had
attacked two unarmed reconnaissance planes. U.S. Ambassador
Vernon Walters responded by presenting  the Security Council
with blowups of two photos showing air-to-air missiles under
the wings and fuselage of one of the Libyan MiGs. Charged
Pentagon spokesman Dan Howard: "The Libyan Ambassador to the
U.N. is a liar." At week's end Gaddafi proposed direct talks
with the U.S. to resolve the dispute.

    The Libyan Floggers had approached the American planes with
apparent deliberation and determination. Flying at 20,000 ft.,
the F-14s picked up the Libyans on their radar screens at 11:57
a.m. on Wednesday. The "bogeys," as U.S. airmen call any
potentially hostile planes, were 72 nautical miles away at
10,000 ft., heading directly toward the U.S. planes and the
Kennedy.

    The F-14s turned away from the approaching aircraft, a clear
signal that the American pilots were not looking for a fight.
To the surprise of the U.S. crews, the Libyan planes shifted
abruptly ("jinked," in pilot jargon) to get back on a
nose-to-nose lineup with the Americans. The distance between
the two pairs of jets was closing at roughly 1,000 m.p.h.

    In another evasive maneuver, the F-14s dove to 3,000 ft.
This gave the Navy flyers a tactical advantage: their radar
could now look up for a clear view of the approaching targets.
The less sophisticated Soviet-made radars on the Libyan craft
had to contend with the clutter of the sea.

    At 11:59 the radar-intercept officer (RIO), seated behind
the lead Tomcat pilot, armed his plane's short-range Sidewinder
missiles and its longer-range Sparrow rockets. Outmanned and
outgunned in their less maneuverable Floggers, the lone Libyan
pilots had to fly their planes, watch their radars and handle
their weapons without airborne help.

    The U.S. pilots made three more efforts to shake their
pursuers. Each time, observers in a Navy E-2C radar plane flying
nearby heard the Libyan ground controller order the MiG pilots
to jink into potential collision courses with the Tomcats. The
MiGs normally carry radar-guided Apex as well as heat-seeking
Aphid missiles. While the Aphid homes in on a jet's fiery
exhaust, the Apex is effective when launched at a target's nose.

    At 12 noon the trailing Tomcat flying in the wing position
locked its radar on one of the Floggers. In numerous past
skirmishes, Libyan pilots had reported any such radar targeting
to their ground controller, who had always told them to break
off and head home. This time, U.S. authorities insisted, the
pilot did not send any such alarm.

    It was almost a minute after noon when the lead Tomcat pilot
informed his flying mates, "Bogeys have jinked back at me again
for the fifth time. They're on my nose now, inside of 20 miles."
 He could wait no longer. "Master arm on," he announced, taking
the final step before delivering a Sparrow. At 14 miles
separation, he barked, "Fox 1. Fox 1." He had triggered a
Sparrow, called Fox 1 (a Sidewinder is Fox 2). The lead Tomcat
launched another Sparrow at ten miles. Both missiles missed.

    Instead of fleeing, the Floggers accelerated and continued
their pursuit. They were now within six miles of the two F-14s.
The Tomcat pilots then split their formation in a classic
maneuver. As the two Floggers followed the U.S. wing plane, the
lead Tomcat circled to get on the Libyan jets' tails.

    The F-14 on the wing delivered a Sparrow, which hit one of
the Libyan planes. "Good kill! Good kill!" shouted one of the
Americans. The lead Tomcat closed on the remaining Flogger. At a
mere 1.5 miles from the MiG -- a deadly distance in modern
combat -- its RIO squeezed his Sidewinder trigger. The
heat-seeking missile smashed into the Flogger.  "Good kill!"
cried a crewman. "Let's get out of here." The two Libyan pilots
parachuted into the sea.

    Why would Gaddafi provoke such a one-sided fight? "We're
still scratching our heads," said the Pentagon's Howard. "It
doesn't make sense." Yet Western standards of what does or does
not make sense may bear little relation to the actions and
motivations of Gaddafi, a man prone to mood swings and
outlandish gestures. Gaddafi has become just about everybody's
most despised dictator, but he holds a special place in Ronald
Reagan's demonology. The President has repeatedly called
Gaddafi a terrorist and a barbarian, and he proudly sports a T
shirt that ridicules his No. 1 enemy with the legend KHADDAFY
DUCK -- MAD DUCK OF THE MIDEAST.

    The U.S. has a solid record of willingness to sock Libya. In
1981 the Navy shot down two Libyan jets whose pilots rashly
fired at American planes over the Gulf of Sidra, which Gaddafi
claims to be Libyan territory. Then, in March 1986, U.S. naval
units deliberately steamed across what Gaddafi had called the
"line of death," which marked the northern boundary of the
gulf. When Libyan gunboats sailed out to challenge the Sixth
Fleet, two were sunk, and a shore radar installation was
destroyed. The following month, after a Libyan-backed terrorist
bombed a disco in West Berlin, killing one American and injuring
60 others, U.S. F-111 and A-6 bombers attacked Tripoli and
Benghazi and even struck at Gaddafi's headquarters in an
apparent attempt to kill him.

    Small wonder that Gaddafi -- and the rest of the world --
took the U.S. threats seriously. The Administration's hints of
force were partly intended to bully other countries into
withholding technical materials and personnel from the Rabta
plant. "If we can scare the foreigners out, Gaddafi can't run
the plant," said a U.S. intelligence source. Last September
American diplomats warned their counterparts in West Germany,
Italy, France, Britain and Japan that the U.S. had persuasive
intelligence that the facility was intended to produce toxic
chemicals on a massive scale. Nearby is a steelworks that can
turn out the shells and casings needed to complete the
poisonous weapons.

    Although unwilling to divulge secret sources, U.S. officials
confirmed that former workers in the plant had provided
sensitive details. At first only the British Foreign Office
seemed to be convinced of the danger. It conducted its own
investigation of the complex and agreed with the U.S. findings.
Later the French, Canadians and Egyptians advised the U.S. that
they too were persuaded. But the Soviets and some U.S. allies
claimed that the evidence was inconclusive.

    Through newspaper leaks, the U.S. accused a West German
firm, Imhausen-Chemie, of secretly supplying expertise and
materials for building the plant. German officials insist that
their investigation has turned up no proof to support these
claims, though they agreed to examine more of the U.S. evidence
this week. Privately the Reagan Administration warns that it
may name five West German companies, two in Switzerland and some
in unidentified other European nations that are involved in the
Rabta project if their governments do not cut off such help to
Gaddafi.

    The announcement two weeks ago that the carrier Theodore
Roosevelt had left Norfolk, Va., to join the Kennedy in the
Mediterranean inspired fresh rumors of an impending U.S. attack
on the Rabta plant. In that heated atmosphere, the Libyans
could well have succumbed to nervousness and overreacted to the
presence of the Kennedy off their coast.

    Yet the Kennedy was sailing to the east last Wednesday. The
carrier was near Crete, more than 600 miles away from the Rabta
plant and 120 miles off recognized Libyan territorial waters,
when the unexpected combat situation arose. Even the Libyans
had to know that the F-14s were fighters on routine patrol, not
bombers carrying out an attack.

    Those facts lead to another, more complicated, theory about
what happened: that Gaddafi deliberately sought the
confrontation, sending his fighters on what amounted to a
suicide mission in the hope of winning sympathy and provoking
international criticism of the U.S. "Colonel Gaddafi knows that
he is irrelevant within the Arab world and can win support only
when he is perceived as the victim of superpower oppression,"
said Congressman Les Aspin, chairman of the House Armed
Services Committee. "Two planes is a cheap price to pay so he
can hear outpourings of fervent backing."

    Was this reckless attack, then, really intended to fail? "We
suspect -- mostly on the basis of the two Libyan pilots
parachuting from their MiGs -- that they intentionally provoked
the incident," said an Italian government official. Besides
being concerned about the chemical plant, added a West German
diplomat, Gaddafi "has been outraged by the P.L.O.'s
concessions to the U.S. for direct contacts, and he could have
seen a chance here to try to sabotage it."

    The unpredictable nature of the Libyan attack and the
trouble it has caused for the U.S. indicate that even after
eight years of American pressure, Muammar Gaddafi retains his
power to bedevil Washington.  As Ronald Reagan departs from the
White House, he leaves behind his Libyan nemesis as one more
problem for George Bush to grapple with.